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Abstract
The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many
countries. Calls to attract the economy’s best and brightest managers
to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into man-
agerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sector,
using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ
in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that,
if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium re-
turn to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As
a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the
private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that
attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by
increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.
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1 Introduction
The quality of management in the public sector is a recurrent concern in
many countries. Part of this concern is based on the perception that the
public sector is an unattractive employer for high-quality managers. Inferior
remuneration and weak financial incentives attract less talented managers
to the public sector and lead them to put little effort in their job. For the
US, this is nicely illustrated by the report of the National Commission on
the Public Service (2003), which concludes that “recognition that there is
much wrong with the current organization and management of the public
service is widespread today.” (p.2) and that “too few of our most talented
citizens are seeking careers in government” (p.iv). Moreover, “too many of
the best recruits are rethinking their commitment, either because they are
fed up with the constraints of outmoded personnel systems and unmet expec-
tations for advancement or simply lured away by the substantial difference
between public and private sector salaries in many areas” (p.8).
Not only policy makers are concerned about the quality of management
in the public sector. Employees in the public sector have similar concerns
and ‘vote with their feet’, as is illustrated by Table 1. This table reports
data from a survey conducted by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations among workers who have quit a public sector job to
take a private sector job or vice versa in 2002 in the Netherlands. The
second and third column of Table 1 list the percentage of workers who claim
that management aspects had been one of the three most important reasons
to quit their former job, for various parts of the public sector.1 Clearly,
workers who moved from the public sector to the private sector mention
management aspects substantially more often than workers who moved in
the opposite direction.
Several policy makers have called for a change: The public sector should
attempt to attract the economy’s best and brightest managers. In the words
of the National Commission on the Public Service (2003): “Salaries for
1Respondents could choose from a list of 19 potential reasons for leaving one’s job,
including items like salary, promotion prospects, atmosphere, and responsibilities. Table
1 gives the percentages of people who among the three most important reasons list either
personnel policies, general management of their unit, or supervision. Similar results arise
if we single out each of these categories. Also, restricting attention to the single most
important reason for leaving or to people who do not supervise anyone themselves do not
alter the general picture.
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Table 1: Percentage of workers moving from the private sector to
the public sector and vice versa who mention management aspects
as one of the three most important reasons to leave their former
job
Number of
% of people moving respondents
Sector Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow
Central 33.9 61.3 329 134
Local 40.4 65.9 681 267
Police 31.3 71.5 444 95
Research1 30.7 66.3 128 31
Hospitals2 41.3 53.4 40 46
Defence 25.6 63.5 159 107
Education 35.5 47.5 432 145
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
All differences between inflow and outflow are significant at
the 1% level except for the sector Hospitals.
1 Research consists of universities and research institutes.
2 Only university hospitals were surveyed.
[executives in government] should be based on the compelling need to recruit
and retain the best people possible.”2 This paper questions this view. In a
nutshell, we show that, if demand for public sector goods is not too high,
perfect competition on all markets results in an equilibrium where relatively
few of the more able managers seek employment in the public sector. The
equilibrium is efficient, both from the point of view of a social planner as well
as of a policy maker aiming to deliver a certain amount of publicly provided
goods at lowest cost. Hence, attempts to attract a more able managerial
workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector
levels are not efficient.
We develop a model of a perfectly competitive economy with two job
types, worker and manager, and two sectors, the public and the private
sector. The sectors differ only in the kind of good that is produced; pro-
2Similar recommendations can be found in a report from the OECD (2001) that studies
countries’ experiences with recruiting and retaining public sector personnel. The report
concludes that “The public sector is not usually able to compete with the salaries offered by
private employers, especially those of highly-educated personnel and managers. However,
pay increases may be necessary to prevent an outflow of highly-qualified personnel.” (p.
29)
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duction technology and the institutional environment are assumed identical.
Production takes place in units consisting of one manager and one or more
workers, where the number of workers is chosen by the manager. Output
is homogeneous within a sector, and is sold at the market-clearing price.
Further, workers receive a market-clearing wage and managers are residual
claimants of their unit.3 Within a unit, two types of tasks complement each
other in production: managerial tasks and non-managerial tasks. Workers
only exert effort on non-managerial tasks, while managers may exert effort
on both tasks.4
Crucially, people in our economy differ in two characteristics. First,
people differ in managerial talent. Talent increases the effectiveness of one’s
effort spent on managerial tasks. As we shall see, in equilibrium better
managers focus on managing and spend less effort on non-managerial tasks;
instead, they hire additional workers. As a result, better managers lead
larger organisations, earn more income, and attain higher utility. For people
with low managerial ability, taking a job is more attractive than managing
a unit, as the residual return of their unit would be too small. These results
are close in spirit to Rosen (1982).
Second, people in our economy differ in public service motivation (PSM),
which we define as a relative preference for working in the public sector.
Public service motivation can arise from a preference for tasks specific to
the public sector, for contributing to goals specific to public organisations,
or for helping the specific set of clients that is served by public organisations
in sectors like health care and education.5 For convenience, we assume that
a person’s PSM is independent of job type or effort. More importantly, we
3This may seem to be a far cry from real-world production and wage determination
in the public sector. However, this setup allows us to analyse self-selection of people into
jobs when no restrictions are being imposed, which gives the efficient allocation. This
serves as a benchmark for evaluating attempts to improve upon the pool of people opting
for public management.
4Examples of managers who also perform non-managerial tasks abound. For instance,
senior surgeons in hospitals both perform surgery and supervise assistants; deans in acad-
emia tend to spend time on managing as well as on teaching and research; and managers
in consultancy firms usually engage in supervision of (junior) staff as well as in provision
of advice to (the more important) clients.
5Recent studies on the motivation of workers in the public sector include Antonazzo et
al. (2003) on nursing workers, Edmonds et al. (2002) on teachers, and Frank and Lewis
(2004) on employees in these and several other areas of the public sector. Le Grand (2003,
ch.2) and Perry and Hondeghem (2008) provide overviews of the empirical literature on
PSM.
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assume that PSM is sufficiently widespread in the economy (or, equivalently,
that demand for public sector output is not too high) so that in equilibrium
the marginal workers and marginal managers have positive public service
motivation. Consequently, an employee’s wage in the public sector is lower
than the wage paid by firms in the private sector. Likewise, the equilibrium
price of public sector goods must be lower than the price of goods in the
private sector. For otherwise, a given amount of production in the public
sector would yield managers equal or higher revenue, lower wage cost, and
higher motivational utility compared to the private sector, so that no one
would be willing to become manager of a unit in the private sector.
These differences in wages and output prices between the public and the
private sector have profound implications for the effect of managerial ability
on a manager’s payoff in the two sectors, and so for the sorting of people into
public and private management. We show that, in any equilibrium where
demand for public goods is not too high, the marginal return to managerial
ability is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. Hence, the
relative attractiveness of the public sector decreases in ability, and when the
right tail of the ability distribution is sufficiently long, the most talented
managers reside in the private sector. Furthermore, the least able managers
may be found in the public sector.
A unique aspect of our analysis is that low remuneration for managers
and workers in the public sector arises endogenously. While this implies that
the public sector attracts managers with relatively low ability, it is the least
costly way of producing a given amount of publicly provided goods. Hence,
attempts to attract a more able managerial workforce to the public sector
by increasing their remuneration to private sector levels are not efficient,
neither from the perspective of a policy maker minimising cost of public
goods provision nor for a social planner maximising social welfare.
The following simplified example highlights the main mechanism behind
the negative selection of managerial talent into the public sector. Consider
a set of entrepreneurs without personnel, who differ in their level of (non-
negative) PSM and in productive ability, and must choose between working
in the public sector or in the private sector. When the output price is equal
in both sectors, an entrepreneur’s income is identical in both sectors, such
that all entrepreneurs prefer to work in the public sector due to its intrinsic
qualities (PSM). This causes the equilibrium output price in the public sector
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to drop below the private sector output price. The lower output price is
particularly costly to highly able entrepreneurs, as they achieve high output
levels. Hence, as the income gap between the public sector and the private
sector widens with ability, the relative attractiveness of the public sector
decreases in ability. Consequently, relatively many of the good entrepreneurs
reside in the private sector.
Our theory is well in line with recent evidence on public-private wage
differentials at the higher echelons as presented by Bargain and Melly (2008),
using data for France. Whereas cross-sectional estimates show substantial
negative public sector wage premiums at the top of the wage distribution,
these are much smaller when controlling for individual fixed effects. Bargain
and Melly (2008) interpret this as: “At the top of the wage distribution,
agents with the highest wage potential ... have self-selected in the private
sector” (p.13).6
Our theory is also applicable beyond the public-private setting. For in-
stance, many non-profit organisations are regarded as intrinsically attractive
(cf. Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Most studies find a negative wage
differential in the non-profit sector (Mocan and Tekin (2002) is a notable
exception), and some attribute this finding partially to selection effects. For
instance, Weisbrod (1983) finds a 20% wage penalty for lawyers in non-profit
‘public interest’ firms, while Goddeeris (1988) argues that a large part of this
differential is driven by selection. In line with our theory, Preston (1989)
finds that the non-profit wage penalty is higher for managers and profession-
als than for sales and clerical workers, and her results support the hypothesis
that the wage difference is partially driven by selection. Lastly, Roomkin
and Weisbrod (1999) show that top executives in for-profit hospitals receive
both larger total income and larger incentive pay than their counterparts
in non-profit hospitals, but the difference is smaller at lower levels in the
hierarchy.
We proceed as follows. The next section discusses related literature.
Section 3 describes the model and Section 4 analyses the optimal choices of
6Earlier papers on public-private wage differentials also find public sector wage penal-
ties at the top of the wage distribution (Poterba and Rueben, 1994; Disney and Gosling,
1998; Melly, 2005), but cannot account for endogenous selection effects. At the bottom of
the wage distribution, empirical studies often find wage premia rather than penalties. One
reason — outside the scope of our theory — for this may be that wage negotiators in the
public sector are less tough than in the private sector, as in e.g. Haskel and Szymanski
(1993). As long as wage premia at the bottom are limited, all of our results go through.
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workers and managers in the two sectors. Section 5 describes individuals’
choice between the four jobs in our economy, for any relative wage and price
level at which production takes place in both sectors. Section 6 characterises
the equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper builds on the literature on compensating wage differentials. The
theory of equalizing differences developed by Rosen (1974) asserts that in a
competitive labour market, marginal workers’ valuation of job attributes is
reflected in compensating wage differentials (see also Brown, 1980; Rosen,
1986). Selection effects complicate the empirical estimation of these com-
pensating wage differentials, see e.g. Goddeeris (1988) and Hwang et al.
(1992). The reason is that wage differentials may also arise from unob-
served differences in workers’ ability, which in turn may be related to job
attributes, e.g. because a worker’s valuation of job attributes depends on his
income (Goddeeris, 1988; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz,
1992). Recent work using matched employee-employer data establishes that
inter-industry wage differentials are largely explained by these unobserved
ability differences (Abowd et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 1999). In line
with these findings, the public-private earnings differential for managers that
arises in our framework is partly a ‘true’ compensating earnings differential
and partly caused by selection, where selection arises endogenously from the
adjustment in prices and wages to differences in sector’s job attributes.
The recent literature in economics on intrinsic motivation studies the
assignment of differently motivated workers to jobs that vary in intrinsic
qualities (Handy and Katz, 1998; Dixit, 2002; Besley and Ghatak, 2005;
Francois, 2007; Prendergast, 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007, 2008). A
key prediction of this literature is relatively low pay and weak monetary
incentives in jobs with high intrinsic qualities, as these lead to self-selection
of job applicants with high motivation (on average).7 We contribute to
this literature by providing the first general equilibrium model of the self-
selection of people who differ in intrinsic motivation and in task-specific
7Boyne (2002) reviews evidence in the public administration and management litera-
ture on differences between private and public organisations, which suggests that public
managers tend to place more emphasis on public service and less on remuneration than
private managers.
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ability into jobs that differ in intrinsic qualities and in tasks.
Other papers have studied the assignment of people with heterogenous
ability to different hierarchical levels in firms. Rosen (1982) and Waldman
(1984) show that if managerial and subordinate inputs are complementary
in production, such that performance at the top affects productivity in lower
hierarchical levels, market forces assign the best-performing individuals to
the top of large organisations. Output, labour input, firm size, and man-
agerial rewards all increase more than proportionally in managerial ability.
Later studies take a dynamic approach by incorporating learning and/or
human capital acquisition in order to explain promotion and wage growth
patterns; see Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for an overview and Costrell and
Loury (2004), Gibbons and Waldman (2006), and Kwon (2006) for recent
contributions. In contrast to these papers, we employ a static model with
only two hierarchical levels; our contribution lies in relaxing the assumption
that all firms are (ex ante) identical. We show that heterogenous preferences
for non-pecuniary job aspects that differ across firms create differences in the
return to managerial ability across firms, and thereby affect job assignment.
3 The Model
We consider a perfectly competitive economy consisting of two sectors s ∈
[g, k]: the public sector (g) and the private sector (k). In both sectors,
production takes place in organisations, each consisting of a manager and a
number of employees. Output produced in sector s is sold at price ps per
unit. Throughout, we assume that demand for products and, hence, prices
are such that production takes place in both sectors of the economy. We
think of demand for publicly provided goods as stemming from a political
process, which we treat as exogenous. In most of the analysis, we shall as-
sume that this demand for publicly provided goods triggers market supply.
Proposition 3, however, will generalise our results to the case where a social
planner or a policy maker who aims to minimise the cost of public goods
provision assigns people to jobs and can differentiate remuneration for sim-
ilar jobs. For simplicity, we assume that taxes are nondistortionary. This
allows us to ignore taxation throughout the analysis.
All N individuals in the economy choose between four occupations: 1)
worker in the private sector; 2) worker in the public sector; 3) manager in the
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private sector; 4) manager in the public sector. Individuals can also decide to
remain non-employed. In the latter case, they obtain outside option utility
U0.
People are heterogenous in two dimensions. First, they differ in manage-
rial ability αi ∈ [0, α¯]. The implications of αi for an individual’s productivity
and payoff will become clear from our description of production technology
below. Second, people differ in their intrinsic preference for working in the
public sector relative to working in the private sector. We assume that this
intrinsic utility only depends on the choice of sector, not on occupation or
effort. In the Concluding Remarks, we discuss the case where intrinsic util-
ity is also dependent on effort choice. Let γsi denote individual i’s intrinsic
utility derived from working in sector s. For convenience, we normalise in-
dividuals’ intrinsic utility from working in the private sector to zero: γki = 0
for all i. This implies that γgi describes an individual’s relative preference
for working in the public sector, which we refer to as ‘public service moti-
vation’ (PSM). Generally, people may intrinsically prefer to work in either
sector; that is, an individual’s γgi can be positive or negative. We focus on
the case where PSM is sufficiently prevalent (or, equivalently, where demand
for publicly provided goods is sufficiently small) so that in equilibrium the
marginal managers and employees have positive public service motivation.
Without further loss of generality, this allows us to reduce the type space
to non-negative PSM: γgi ∈ [0, γ¯]. The density of the joint distribution of αi
and γgi is described by f(α, γ) > 0 over its support [0, α¯] × [0, γ¯] and zero
elsewhere.
Production technology is identical across sectors. Two types of tasks are
performed in a unit: managerial tasks and non-managerial tasks. Let msi,j
and esi,j be the amount of effort exerted on managerial and non-managerial
tasks, respectively, by individual i in occupation j ∈ [w,m] when working in
sector s, where subscript j = w denotes worker and j = m denotes manager.
We assume that workers only perform non-managerial tasks, msi,w = 0 for
all i and s, while a manager can provide effort on both tasks. We thus allow
managers to perform multiple tasks, which — as we shall see — managers find
in their interest unless their managerial ability is sufficiently high. Let nsi
denote the number of workers employed by manager i in sector s. Production
8
q in this manager’s unit is described by:
q(E,M) = q(nsi e
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m). (1)
Production thus depends on the total amount of effort spent on non-managerial
tasks, E = nsi e
s
w + esi,m, and on effective managerial effort, M = αim
s
i,m.
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We make the following assumptions about the production function. First,
to generate production in a unit, both managerial and non-managerial tasks
must be performed, q(E, 0) = q(0,M) = 0. Second, a unit’s production is
concave in both elements: qE > 0, qEE < 0, qM > 0, qMM < 0, where,
throughout the paper, subscripts to functions denote partial derivatives.
Third, we assume that effective managerial effort increases the marginal
productivity of effort on non-managerial tasks: qEM > 0. By Young’s the-
orem, this assumption also implies that the marginal return to manage-
ment is higher in units where more non-managerial effort is being provided
(qME > 0).9 Further note that (1) implies that, all else equal, the produc-
tivity of managerial effort msi,m increases in managerial ability αi. We thus
assume that for a given level of managerial effort, more able managers estab-
lish more productive management practices than less able managers. Note
also that, for given M , an individual’s managerial ability αi is irrelevant
for his productivity in performing non-managerial tasks. This is innocuous:
all results carry over when ability has a positive but limited effect on the
productivity of effort spent on non-managerial tasks. We make the following
additional assumption on the shape of the production function:
qM + αimsi,m
∙
qMM −
q2EM
qEE
¸
> 0, (2)
where we have suppressed the arguments of the derivatives of the produc-
tion function for clarity. Assumption (2) assures that q(E,M) is not too
concave, so that more able managers find it worthwhile to put in more man-
agerial effort msi,m than less able managers, see Proposition 1.
10 Lastly, we
8Here, we use the result, derived in Section 4.1, that in equilibrium all workers in sector
s exert the same level of effort. This allows us to write the total amount of effort exerted
by workers in the unit as nsi esw.
9The complementarity between managerial ability and non-managerial input is also an
important feature in Rosen (1982).
10This is a mild restriction. It allows, for instance, for Cobb-Douglas and logarithmic
production functions.
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assume that the third derivatives of q(E,M) are not too large; the proof of
Proposition 2 contains the exact restriction.
Individuals derive utility from their income y and from their intrinsic
preference for working in a sector γsi . They derive disutility from exerting
effort. We assume that an individual’s cost of effort depends on the sum of
his effort spent on managerial and non-managerial tasks. Hence, utility of
individual i working in sector s in occupation j is given by:
Usi,j = y
s
i,j + γ
s
i − c(esi,j +msi,j). (3)
As usual, the cost of effort are increasing and convex: ce = cm > 0, cee =
cmm = cem > 0.
Managers pay workers a wage per unit of effort. Allowing firms to pay
a base salary or, more generally, to offer non-linear wage schemes does not
change any of our results, because competition for workers rules out rent
extraction and risk neutrality implies that there is no trade-off between
incentives and risk-sharing.11 The wage per unit of effort in sector s equals
ws. In equilibrium, wages are such that in both sectors, supply of and
demand for workers are equal. The income of a worker employed by a firm
in sector s equals
ysi,w = w
sesi,w. (4)
For convenience and without loss of generality, we assume that the distri-
bution of individuals is such that at the market-clearing wage levels some
individuals end up nonemployed. This assumption requires that U0 ≥ 0 and
that f(α, γ) has sufficient mass in the vicinity of (0, 0).12
Managers are the residual claimants of their unit. Hence, a manager’s
income equals the revenues of his unit minus costs. The income of manager
i in sector s who employs nsi workers equals:
ysi,m = p
sq(nsie
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m)−wsnsi esw − h, (5)
11We abstract from explicit moral hazard issues. One interpretation of the complemen-
tarity between managerial and non-managerial effort is that good managers are better in
channeling employees’ efforts towards the most productive tasks.
12Note that U0 < 0 implies full employment because, in that case, individuals would
always weakly prefer having a job involving no effort and paying a wage equal to U0 < 0 to
being nonemployed. That is, people would be willing to pay a firm to exit nonemployment,
which results in full employment in equilibrium.
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where h is a fixed management cost. These cost include, among others, the
cost of setting up a unit and overhead costs. We assume that h is sufficiently
high such that there are no individuals who prefer to become ‘manager’ of a
unit without any employees (nsi = 0) rather than becoming either employee
or manager of a unit with employees.
4 Behaviour of Managers and Workers
4.1 Workers’ effort and wages
As workers do not engage in managerial tasks, the only effort decision for
workers is how much effort to put into the non-managerial tasks. Substitut-
ing income (4) into the utility function (3) and maximising with respect to
esw, we obtain the following first-order condition for optimal effort:
ws − ce(esw) = 0. (6)
Note that we have suppressed subscript i, since optimal effort does neither
depend on αi nor on γ
g
i . The second-order condition is satisfied by the
convexity of the cost of effort function. Let e˜sw be the solution to (6) for
workers in sector s. The utility of workers in the private sector and in the
public sector is given by, respectively:
Ukw = w
ke˜kw − c(e˜kw), (7)
Ugi,w = w
ge˜gw + γ
g
i − c(e˜gw). (8)
Note that private sector workers’ utility is independent of type. Hence,
given that in equilibrium some individuals are nonemployed and receive
outside option utility U0, competition ensures that workers in the private
sector achieve utility U0. Suppose, instead, that the utility of workers in
the private sector would exceed U0. Then, the nonemployed would underbid
the employed workers. Similarly, if workers’ utility would be lower than
U0, then nobody would prefer being a worker in the private sector to being
nonemployed, resulting in an increase in the private sector wage. Hence,
wage wk is determined by the participation constraint:
wke˜kw − c(e˜kw) = U0. (9)
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Utility of public sector workers is independent of αi and increasing in γ
g
i .
Hence, except for the marginal workers, workers in the public sector earn
a rent. The identity of the marginal workers follows from equating (7) and
(8):
wg e˜gw + bγ − c(e˜gw) = wke˜kw − c(e˜kw) = U0, (10)
where bγ denotes the level of γgi at which individuals are indifferent between
working in the public and the private sector. Totally differentiating (10)
and using (6) we find a negative relation between wg and bγ and a positive
relation between wk and bγ:
dbγ
dwg
= − 1
e˜gw
< 0;
dbγ
dwk
=
1
e˜kw
> 0. (11)
Intuitively, an increase in the wage in the public sector attracts some workers
from the private sector. These have a lower intrinsic utility than workers
who were already employed in the public sector (i.e., bγ reduces). Likewise,
when working in the private sector becomes more rewarding, some public
sector workers move to the private sector, as their intrinsic utility no longer
makes up for the difference in wages. Hence, the intrinsic utility of the
marginal worker bγ increases.
Using (10) and (6), we find that if wg = wk, then bγ = 0. Since γgi ∈
[0, γ¯], it follows that with uniform wages across sectors all individuals prefer
working in the public sector to working in the private sector. Hence, using
(11), it follows that in any equilibrium where a strictly positive number
of people prefer being a worker in the private sector to being a worker in
the public sector, it must hold that wk > wg. Thus, there is a negative
compensating wage differential in the public sector as the marginal public
sector worker derives positive intrinsic utility from working in the public
sector. Using (6), a consequence of wk > wg is that workers in the private
sector put in more effort than workers in the public sector: e˜kw > e˜
g
w. Clearly,
the negative compensating wage differential dilutes financial incentives to
exert effort in the public sector. Lemma 1 summarises these findings.
Lemma 1 There is a single level of γgi , denoted by bγ, at which individuals
are indifferent between working in the public and the private sector. Indi-
viduals with γgi > bγ strictly prefer working in the public sector to working in
the private sector, and individuals with γgi < bγ strictly prefer working in the
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private sector. bγ decreases with the public sector wage wg and increases with
the private sector wage wk. For any bγ > 0, it must hold that wk > wg. This
negative compensating wage differential implies that workers in the private
sector exert more effort than workers in the public sector: e˜kw > e˜
g
w.
4.2 Managers’ effort, employment choice, and profits
Managers choose how many workers to hire and how much effort to spend
on managerial and non-managerial tasks, taking the wage ws and the price
ps as given. Substituting manager’s income (5) into utility function (3)
and maximising with respect to msi,m, e
s
i,m, and n
s
i , we obtain the following
first-order conditions:
αipsqM(nsi e˜
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m)− cm(esi,m +msi,m) = 0, (12)
psqE(nsi e˜
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m)− ce(esi,m +msi,m) = 0, (13)
psqE(nsi e˜
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m)− ws = 0. (14)
In Appendix A.1, we show that the second-order conditions for a global
maximum are satisfied if for all msi,m, e
s
i,m, and n
s
i :
qMMqEE − q2EM > 0. (15)
Let m˜si,m, e˜
s
i,m, and n˜
s
i be the joint solution to (12), (13), and (14) for
manager i in sector s. Note that this solution does not depend on γsi . The
utility of private sector managers and public sector managers is given by,
respectively:
Uki,m = p
kq(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m)− n˜kiwke˜kw − c(m˜ki,m + e˜ki,m)− h, (16)
Ugi,m = p
gq(n˜gi e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m)− n˜
g
iw
g e˜gw + γ
g
i − c(m˜
g
i,m + e˜
g
i,m)− h. (17)
Combining (13) and (14) and the first-order condition for optimal effort
of workers (6), we find that e˜si,m + m˜
s
i,m = e˜
s
w. Hence, managers in sector
s exert the same amount of effort as workers in the same sector. Since private
sector workers put in more effort than public sector workers (see Lemma 1),
it follows that private sector managers put in more effort than public sector
managers.
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Proposition 1 describes the comparative static effects of managerial abil-
ity αi, the wage ws, and the product price ps on managers’ decisions.
Proposition 1 If condition (2) on the concavity of the production function
is satisfied, then it holds that in a given sector managers with higher ability
αi optimally exert more managerial effort (higher m˜si,m), exert less non-
managerial effort (lower e˜si,m), employ more workers (higher n˜
s
i ), and evoke
higher total nonmanagerial effort (n˜si e˜
s
w+e˜si,m). Managers with higher ability
achieve higher production, higher income, and higher utility. An increase in
the price ps or a decrease in the wage ws induces managers to increase man-
agerial effort m˜si,m, decrease their nonmanagerial effort e˜
s
i,m, and increase
employment n˜si and total nonmanagerial effort n˜
s
i e˜
s
w + e˜si,m.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 shows that better managers spend more effort on man-
aging their organisation and less effort on non-managerial tasks than less
talented managers. Better managers also run bigger organisations, earn
higher income, and achieve higher utility. Clearly, the complementarity be-
tween managerial and non-managerial tasks makes it attractive for highly
able managers to hire many workers and increase their productivity through
high managerial effort. High managerial effort implies high marginal cost of
effort, and so highly able managers exert little non-managerial effort them-
selves.13 A higher product price induces managers to expand production by
increasing employment and exerting more managerial effort, which comes
at the expense of the manager’s non-managerial effort. Conversely, higher
wages result in lower employment, less management effort, and a higher level
of non-managerial effort provided by the manager himself.
When wages and/or prices differ between sectors, managers in the public
sector act differently from managers with the same ability in the private
sector. As noted before, the lower wage in the public sector makes that
13Highly able managers may optimally decide to only engage in managerial tasks and
to set esi,m = 0. This occurs when at the solution to first-order condition (12) with
esi,m = 0, we have that cm(m
s
i,m) > w
s. Generally, in equilibrium, the marginal managers
in both sectors optimally choose esi,m > 0, unless h is very high. We therefore focus in the
following on the case where the marginal managers perform multiple tasks. In Appendix
A.3, we show that the comparative static effects of αi on msi,m and nsi at levels of αi
where managers optimally set esi,m = 0 have the same sign but are generally smaller in
magnitude. Intuitively, esi,m = 0 implies that the marginal cost of msi,m cannot be reduced
by further decreasing esi,m.
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managers exert less effort in total when managing a public organisation.
The following lemma describes several other differences between managers’
decisions in the two sectors.
Lemma 2 Comparing organisations led by managers with the same ability
αi across sectors, it holds that in the sector where w
s
ps is higher, managerial
effort m˜si,m, total effort on non-managerial tasks n˜
s
i e˜
s
w+ e˜si,m, and production
are lower.
Proof. Combining first-order conditions (12), (13), and (14), we obtain
αiqM(nsi e˜
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m) = qE(n
s
i e˜
s
w + e
s
i,m, αim
s
i,m) =
ws
ps
. (18)
Hence, for a given managerial ability αi, both qM(nsi e˜
s
w + esi,m, αim
s
i,m) and
qE(nsi e˜
s
w+esi,m, αim
s
i,m) increase in
ws
ps . By second-order condition (15), this
dual increase can only be attained through a reduction in both nsi e˜
s
w + esi,m
and msi,m. Since qE < 0 and qM < 0 , these reductions negatively affect
production.
It follows from Lemma 2 that if
wg
pg
=
wk
pk
, managers with equal ability
exert the same level of managerial effort in both sectors and evoke simi-
lar total effort on non-managerial tasks. Note, however, that even if the
wage-price ratio is identical across sectors, the lower wage in the public
sector implies that managers in public organisations exert less effort on non-
managerial tasks themselves and rely more on effort exerted by their work-
ers. Intuitively, if it is less expensive to hire workers for the non-managerial
tasks, it pays for a manager to exert less effort on these tasks himself. The
following section will show that not only wages, but also prices are lower in
the public sector. As it turns out, whether the wage-price ratio is higher
or lower in the public sector critically depends on the exact distribution of
management talent and public service motivation in the population.
5 Occupational Choice
Individuals in our economy can choose between four occupations and the
outside option. Since the equilibrium payoff of a private sector worker equals
the outside option utility for all individuals (see (9)), people effectively face
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four different options.14 We proceed by making pairwise comparisons be-
tween these options, to establish which types are indifferent between any
two occupations. Graphing the six indifference lines that arise in the (α, γ)-
plane characterises the equilibrium allocation of individuals’ types to jobs for
given wages and prices. In the next section, we shall study the equilibrium
levels of wages and prices in the two sectors.
Indifference line 1: Private worker / private manager
When people must choose between becoming worker or manager in the pri-
vate sector, their motivation to work in the public sector γgi is irrelevant.
This implies that the level of managerial ability at which people are indif-
ferent between becoming private sector worker and private sector manager
does not depend on γgi . Lemma 3 follows.
Lemma 3 There is a single value of managerial ability αi at which people
are indifferent between working in a private sector organisation and man-
aging a private sector organisation. Individuals with higher ability prefer to
become manager, people with lower ability prefer to become worker. Denote
this level of ability by bαk. It is implicitly described by
pkq(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, bαkm˜ki,m)− ³n˜ki + 1´wke˜kw − h = 0. (19)
bαk is strictly positive and independent of γgi .
Proof. The first part follows from observing that private sector workers’
utility (7) is constant in both γgi and αi whereas private sector managers’
utility (16) is constant in γgi and increasing in αi:
dUki,m
dαi
= m˜ki,mp
kqM(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m) > 0, (20)
where the effects through changes in m˜ki,m, e˜
k
i,m, and n˜
k
i are zero by the
envelop theorem. Equation (19) follows from setting (7) equal to (16), and
using the result derived in Section 3 that m˜ki,m + e˜
k
i,m = e˜
k
w. From (19) it is
14Note that workers’ utility and optimal effort are independent of their manager’s type,
and that managers do not care about workers’ type. Hence, to make optimal choices,
individuals only need information about wages, prices, and their own type. In other words,
whether an individuals’ public service motivation and/or managerial ability is public or
private information is irrelevant for our results.
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clear that bαk is independent of γgi . Further, since q(E, 0) = 0, h > 0, and
U0 > 0 (implying that the left-hand side of (19) is strictly negative when
α = 0), equation (20) implies that bαk is strictly positive.
Managerial ability affects the profitability of running an organisation,
with better managers making more money. The assumption that q(E, 0) = 0
implies that individuals with αi = 0 always prefer being an employee over
being a manager. Hence, bαk > 0. Using (19), it is also easily verified that
a higher price pk and a lower management cost h makes a management
position in the private sector more attractive (bαk decreases). A higher wage
wk increases bαk for two reasons: it increases income when opting for a
private sector job and increases wage costs when running a private sector
organisation.
Indifference line 2: Private worker / public worker
Lemma 1 has established that there is a single level of intrinsic utility bγ at
which individuals are indifferent between working in a private organisation
and working in a public organisation. Rewriting (10), bγ is given by:
bγ = U0 + c(e˜gw)− wge˜gw. (21)
Clearly, bγ is independent of αi. Lemma 1 has also already shown thatbγ increases with the wage differential between the private sector and the
public sector.
Indifference line 3: Private manager / public worker
An individual i is indifferent between working in the public sector and man-
aging an organisation in the private sector when (8) equals (16). Using (10),
this can be written as:
γgi = p
kq(n˜ki e˜
k
w+e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m)−n˜kiwke˜kw−c(m˜ki,m+e˜ki,m)−h−[U0 − bγ] . (22)
Using (9), we find that if γgi = bγ, equation (22) reduces to (19). Hence,
indifference line 3 runs through the intersection of line 1 and line 2 (bαk, bγ).
This makes sense: Individuals who are indifferent between being a private
worker and being a private manager (line 1) and also between being a pri-
vate worker and being a public worker (line 2), should also be indifferent
between being a private manager and being a public worker (line 3). Totally
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differentiating equation (22) to γgi and αi gives after some rewriting:
dγgi
dαi
= m˜ki,mp
kqM(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m) > 0, (23)
where the effects through changes in m˜ki,m, e˜
k
i,m, and n˜
k
i are zero by the
envelop theorem. Hence, indifference line 3 is upward sloping in the (α, γ)-
plane: the higher an individual’s αi, the higher the level of γ
g
i necessary to
make the individual prefer to become a worker in the public sector rather
than manager in the private sector. The intuition is clear. Managerial
ability increases the return to managing a private organisation. Therefore,
highly able people only prefer being a worker in the public sector if their
intrinsic utility is sufficiently high. Hence, working in the public sector is
preferred by people with low ability and a large preference for the public
sector, whereas talented individuals with little preference for the public sec-
tor prefer managing a private organisation. For individuals with αi = 0,
the first three terms in equation (22) are zero while the other terms are
negative, implying that only a sufficiently negative taste for working in the
public sector would make them indifferent.15 In other words, even people
without a preference for working in the public sector must have a strictly
positive level of managerial ability to favour the management position.
Just as an intermezzo, a graphical representation of the first three indif-
ference lines in the (α, γ)-plane is shown in Figure 1. Each line is bold in
its relevant range and dashed when it is irrelevant.16 The exact positions
of the lines depend on prices and wages in the sectors. Note that, while
the α-intercept and the slope of line 3 are unambiguously positive (see (22)
and (23)), the exact shape of line 3 is ambiguous. This can be seen by
differentiating (23):
d2γgi
dα2i
= −pkqM
⎛
⎝
qM + 2αim˜ki,m
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
α2i
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
⎞
⎠ , (24)
15The first three terms are zero because a manager with αi = 0 would optimally set
n˜ki = 0. The last terms (−h− [U0 − eγ]) are negative; this can be seen using (21) and (6)
and noting that the convexity of the cost of effort function implies that c(e˜gw) < ce(e˜gw)e˜gw.
16For instance, for values of α > eαk, line 2 is irrelevant: Since these individuals prefer
being private manager to being private worker, the issue whether they prefer being private
worker to being public worker is immaterial. The three additional indifference lines that
we will discuss next render additional parts of the first three indifference lines irrelevant,
see Figures 2A and 2B below.
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where we have suppressed the arguments of the derivatives of the production
function for clarity. If (24) is positive (negative) for all αi ≥ 0, then line
3 is convex (concave). Generally, we cannot say whether the expression in
(24) is (always) positive or negative.17 Independent of the shape of line
3, Figure 1 suggests that individuals with low managerial ability and little
preference for the public sector prefer being a worker in the private sector
(or being nonemployed). Workers in the public sector have relatively high
levels of γgi , and managers in the private sector have a relatively high αi. At
first glance, one might expect that the managers in the public sector will be
located in the upper-right part of Figure 1, having both high αi and high
γgi . Generally, however, this is not the case, as we show now.
Indifference line 4: Private manager / public manager
An individual i is indifferent between managing an organisation in the pri-
vate sector and managing an organisation in the public sector when (16)
equals (17), which can be written as:
γgi = p
kq(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m)− n˜kiwke˜kw − c(m˜ki,m + e˜ki,m) (25)
−
h
pgq(n˜gi e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m)− n˜
g
iw
ge˜gw − c(m˜
g
i,m + e˜
g
i,m)
i
.
Individuals with αi = 0 do not generate income as a manager in either
sector, and, hence, are indifferent between the two positions when they do
not intrinsically prefer one sector over the other, i.e. when γgi = 0. Line 4
thus crosses the origin of the (α, γ)-plane.
By Lemma 1, wage cost per unit of effort are lower in the public sector
than in the private sector. Furthermore, our assumption that γgi ≥ 0 implies
that all else equal, all people prefer to manage a public sector organisation
over a private sector organisation. Lemma 4 states that to have a strictly
positive number of people in the economy prefer the management job in the
private sector to the management job in the public sector, pk must be larger
than pg.
Lemma 4 If pk ≤ pg, all individuals with αi > 0 and γgi ≥ 0 prefer being a
manager in the public sector to being a manager in the private sector. Only
when pk is sufficiently higher than pg, a strictly positive number of people
prefer managing a private organisation to managing a public organisation.
17Note that the condition for convexity of line 3 is stronger than condition (2).
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Proof. By Lemma 1, wk > wg and so for a given level of labour inputs
niew, total wage costs are lower in the public sector. Consider a manager
with αi > 0 who optimally sets m˜ki,m, e˜
k
i,m, and n˜
k
i when running a private
organisation. Suppose this manager would set the same levels of m, e, and n
in a public sector organisation, implying the same level of production. Then,
if pk ≤ pg, his payoff in the public sector is always higher because revenues
are weakly higher, wage costs are strictly lower, and, since γgi ≥ 0, intrinsic
utility is weakly higher (see (25)). Settingmgi,m, e
g
i,m, and n
g
i at their optimal
levels increases the payoff of being a public manager even further. Hence,
if pk ≤ pg, all individuals with αi > 0 and γgi ≥ 0 prefer managing a public
sector organisation to managing a private sector organisation. Increasing pk
makes managing a private sector organisation more attractive, while leaving
the payoff from managing a public organisation unchanged. Hence, the last
part of the lemma follows.
Lemma 4 is crucial to our results. It shows that competition between
differently motivated people for management positions in the two sectors
results in a difference in output prices. In our case, the output in the public
sector must be lower than in the private sector as the marginal manager
derives positive non-pecuniary benefits from being active in the public sec-
tor. This effect is strengthened by the lower cost of labour in the public
sector, which arises from positive public service motivation of the marginal
worker. Only when pk is sufficiently higher than pg, some managers generate
sufficiently more revenue by running a private sector unit than by running a
public sector unit so as to make up for the higher labour cost and (weakly)
lower intrinsic utility.
This difference in prices has profound implications for the effect of man-
agement ability on a manager’s payoff in the two sectors, and so for the
sorting of highly able managers into the public sector. This can be seen by
differentiating (25), which gives the slope of line 4:
dγgi
dαi
= pkm˜ki,mqM(n˜
k
i e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m)− pgm˜
g
i,mqM(n˜
g
i e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m).
(26)
The effect of α on managerial utility runs through an increase in production
and, hence, revenue.18 As pk > pg, a given increase in production is more
18All effects through employment, management effort, and the manager’s nonmanagerial
effort are zero by the envelop theorem.
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valuable in the private sector. Yet, the slope of (25) also depends on how
much additional production an increase in α generates, which might be
higher in the public sector. Proposition 2 shows that, in the relevant case
where a strictly positive number of people prefer to become manager in the
private sector, revenues rise faster with ability in the private sector than in
the public sector, and hence line 4 is upward-sloping in the relevant area.
Proposition 2 Given that some individuals prefer to be manager in the
public sector and others to be manager in the private sector, line 4 is upward
sloping for all αi > 0 and γ
g
i ≥ 0.
Proof. As wk > wg, it follows from (18) that for a given level of αi,
pkqM(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜ki,m, αim˜
k
i,m) > p
gqM(n˜
g
i e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m). By Lemma 2, if
wk
pk
≤ w
g
pg
we have that m˜ki,m ≥ m˜
g
i,m. Hence, if
wk
pk
≤ w
g
pg
, (26) is positive,
implying that line 4 is upward sloping for all αi. However, if
wk
pk
>
wg
pg
, we
have that m˜ki,m < m˜
g
i,m, implying that (26) can be negative. In Appendix
A.4, we prove that if (26) is negative for some range of αi, it must be that
(25) is U-shaped in order to have managers in the private sector. As line
4 starts in the origin, this implies that for levels of αi > 0 at which (25) is
non-negative, the slope of line 4 is positive.
The interpretation behind this result is straightforward. Lemma 4 showed
that, as a result of lower wage cost and higher intrinsic utility in the pub-
lic sector, the equilibrium price of public sector goods is lower than the
price of private sector goods. This creates a difference in managerial income
between the two sectors that is increasing in ability. In other words, the
higher output price in the private sector is particularly attractive to highly
able managers, as they run large organisations producing lots of output.
This effect is reinforced when managers in the private sector exert more
managerial effort compared to equally able managers in the public sector,
as this implies that output rises faster with managerial ability in the pri-
vate sector than in the public sector. However, it cannot be ruled out that
for given ability managerial effort is higher in the public sector than in the
private sector (m˜gi,m > m˜
k
i,m), as we have seen in Lemma 2. When m˜
g
i,m is
sufficiently larger than m˜ki,m, it is possible that an increase in ability yields
so much more additional production in the public sector that despite the
lower price level, revenue in the public sector rises more with ability than in
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the private sector. In this case, however, the proof of Proposition 2 shows
that there are no managers in the private sector at all, unless line 4 slopes
upward for sufficiently high values of αi. Hence, Proposition 2 shows that if
equilibrium wages and prices are such that production takes place in both
sectors of the economy, line 4 has an upward slope in the relevant area. In
other words, the return to managerial ability is higher for managers in the
private sector than for managers in the public sector.19
Lastly, comparing (26) with (23), we find that for any value of αi > 0,
the slope of indifference line 3 is larger than the slope of line 4. Moreover,
comparing (25) with (22), it follows that at αi = 0 line 4 lies above line 3.
These two results imply that there is only one point of intersection between
line 3 and line 4.
Indifference line 5: Public worker / public manager
Next consider the choice between working in or managing an organisation
in the public sector. As the intrinsic utility people derive from being active
in the public sector is independent of their occupation, γgi has no effect on
this choice. Only managerial ability matters. Lemma 5 follows.
Lemma 5 There is a single value of managerial ability αi at which people
are indifferent between working in a public sector organisation and managing
a public sector organisation. Individuals with higher ability prefer to become
manager, people with lower ability prefer to become worker. Denote this level
of ability by bαg. It is implicitly described by
pgq(n˜gi e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, bαgm˜gi,m)− [n˜gi + 1]wg e˜gw − h = 0. (27)
bαg is positive and independent of γgi .
Proof. The first part follows from i) observing that workers’ utility (8) and
managers’ utility (17) are increasing in γgi with the same slope; ii) observing
that workers’ utility (8) is constant in αi whereas managers’ utility (17) is
19 If we would allow for negative public service motivation γg, it is possible that equilib-
rium wages and prices are such that (25) is negative and decreasing in ability. In contrast
to the evidence discussed in the Introduction, this would imply that managers would earn
more in the public sector than in the private sector, and that only people with sufficient
distaste for working in the public sector would opt for a private management position.
Given the evidence, we believe that the results we highlight are most relevant.
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increasing in αi:
dUgi,m
dαi
= m˜gi,mp
gqM(n˜
g
i e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m) > 0, (28)
where the effects through changes in m˜gi,m, e˜
g
i,m, and n˜
g
i are zero by the
envelop theorem. Equation (27) follows from setting (8) equal to (17), and
using m˜gi,m + e˜
g
i,m = e˜
g
w. From (27) it is clear that bαg is independent of γgi .
Further, since q(E, 0) = 0, h > 0, and U0 > 0 (implying that the left-hand
side of (27) is strictly negative when α = 0), (28) implies that bαg is strictly
positive.
Obviously, only individuals with a sufficient level of managerial ability
prefer the management position. An important issue is whether this level
(bαg) is larger or smaller than the level of managerial ability at which individ-
uals are indifferent between working in and managing a private organisation
(bαk), as described by Lemma 3. Comparing (19) and (27), it is clear that
this only depends on the wage and price levels in the sectors. While the
high price in the private sector implies a relatively low bαk, the high wage
pushes bαk in the opposite direction. Generally, one cannot say which of
these forces is strongest. This ultimately depends on the properties of the
density function f(α, γ). For instance, when an intrinsic preference for the
public sector is particularly prevalent among potential workers rather than
among potential managers, the effect on wages will dominate.
We have shown that there is one intersection between indifference lines 3
and 4. This intersection locates the type that is indifferent between working
in the public sector and managing an organisation in either sector. Hence,
indifference line 5 must run through the intersection of lines 3 and 4, which
is confirmed by comparing (27) with (22) and (25).
Indifference line 6: Private worker / public manager
Lastly, consider the choice between working in a private organisation and
managing a public organisation. Both good management skills and a large
preference for the public sector make it attractive to opt for the management
position. An individual i is indifferent when (7) equals (17). Using (9), this
can be rewritten to:
γgi = U0 −
h
pgq(n˜gi e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m)− n˜
g
iw
ge˜gw − c(m˜
g
i,m + e˜
g
i,m)− h
i
.
(29)
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For individuals with αi = 0, the first three terms between the brackets in
(29) are zero. Hence, only a very positive attitude towards the public sector
(γgi = U0+h > 0) would make these untalented individuals indifferent. Line
6 is downward sloping in the (α, γ)-plane:
dγgi
dαi
= −m˜gi,mpgqM(n˜
g
i e˜
g
w + e˜
g
i,m, αim˜
g
i,m) < 0,
where we have again applied the envelop theorem to drop terms related to
changes in endogenous variables. As more talented people generate more
income as a manager than people with lower αi, a lower level of intrinsic
utility is sufficient to make them prefer the management job in the public
sector. As in the case of line 3, the intercept and slope of line 6 have an
unambiguous sign, but the exact shape is unclear:
d2γgi
dα2i
= pgqM
⎛
⎝
qM + 2αim˜
g
i,m
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
α2i
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
⎞
⎠ ,
which can be positive or negative.
At the intersection of indifference lines 1 and 4, people are indifferent
between being a worker in the private sector and a management position in
either sector. Hence, line 6 runs through the intersection of lines 1 and 4.
Similarly, line 6 runs through the intersection of lines 2 and 5.
The complete picture
Adding indifference lines 4, 5, and 6 to Figure 1 gives either Figure 2A or
Figure 2B. The main difference between these two figures is the position of
line 5 compared to line 1, or, equivalently, the level of bαg compared to bαk.
As we have seen, the location of these two lines depends on relative wages
and prices in the two sectors. With a relatively high wg and low pg, for
many individuals the public management position is unattractive compared
to either the private management position or the public worker position.
Line 5 then lies to the right of line 1. As depicted in Figure 2A, this also
implies that line 6 is redundant: There are no individuals who prefer being
a worker in the private sector as well as being a manager in the public sector
over the two other positions. Hence, the managers in the public sector are
contained in the area between line 4 and line 5. In the other case where
wages and prices are more favourable for managers in the public sector,
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public management also becomes attractive to individuals with intermediate
ability and motivation. Line 5 then lies to the left of line 1. As depicted
in Figure 2B, this implies that the public managers are located in the area
between line 4, line 5, and line 6.20
Comparing the distributions of managerial ability among private and
public managers, two results stand out. First, due to the positive slope of
line 4 (Proposition 2), there are relatively many managers in the private
sector with very high ability. In other words, there is negative selection of
managerial ability into the public sector. The intuition behind this result is
clear. As we have seen, public service motivation reduces labour cost and
yields a nonpecuniary benefit for managers in the public sector. By Lemma
4, this implies that to have any private production in equilibrium, the output
price must be higher in the private sector than in the public sector. As a
unit’s output increases in managerial ability, the higher output price in the
private sector is particularly attractive to good managers. At high levels of
ability, managers can earn so much more in the private sector that only a
very strong preference for the public sector keeps them from setting up a
private firm.
Second, when bαg < bαk as in Figure 2B, then the economy’s least able
managers are found in the public sector. The reverse is true when bαg > bαk,
a situation that is depicted by Figure 2A. Whether an equilibrium as in
Figure 2A or as in Figure 2B arises, crucially depends on the distribution of
types, f(α, γ). We shall further examine this issue in the next section.
Overall, our results give a bleak picture of the quality of public man-
agement: Relatively few among the highly able managers choose careers in
public service, and the worst managers may be found in public service. Yet,
this is as good as it gets: it is the most efficient way of public production.
This follows directly from the absence of market failures in our product and
labour markets. In other words, given some level of public production, any
attempt to deviate from the effort levels, establishment sizes, or individuals’
selection into non-managerial and managerial positions in the public sector
that arise under competition only translates into higher cost of public pro-
duction and, hence, lower welfare. Proposition 3 underlines this result. For
20Recall that it is possible that line 4 is U-shaped with negative slope in the origin.
Then, the intersection of line 3 and line 4 occurs at a negative γg and, hence, to the left
of eαk. It follows that line 5 (i.e. eαg) is located to the left of line 1. Hence, a situation as
depicted in Figure 2B emerges.
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the sake of completeness, the proof shows that both a fully informed public
monopsonist aiming to minimise the cost of producing a given amount of
public sector goods, as well as a social planner aiming to maximise the sum
of all individuals’ utilities, recruit the same people into public employment,
assign them to the same job, and induce the same effort as results under
competition.21
Proposition 3 The self-selection of individuals into managerial and non-
managerial positions in the public sector and their choices with respect to
effort levels and unit sizes are efficient, both from the perspective of a policy
maker aiming to minimise cost of public goods provision and from a social-
welfare perspective.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, demand for workers must equal supply of workers in both
sectors. Prices and wages adjust to attain equilibrium. Since we have as-
sumed that some individuals remain nonemployed and obtain their outside
option utility, the wage in the private sector is determined by the partici-
pation constraint (9). The wage in the public sector determines both the
attractiveness of working in the public sector and the profitability of man-
aging an organisation in the public sector. Therefore, the wage in the public
sector affects all indifference lines, except for line 1. Proposition 4 estab-
lishes that a higher wage in the public sector implies that more people are
willing to become worker in the public sector while demand for public sector
workers reduces.
Proposition 4 Suppose pg and pk are such that production takes place in
both sectors. Then, for given pg and pk, a higher wg leads to greater supply
of public sector workers and smaller demand for public sector workers.
21Note that the fully informed public monopsonist does extract all motivational rents
from those in the public sector, by setting an individual’s wage such that the participation
constraint binds. When individuals’ types are private information, the public monopsonist
will distort contracts and alter the set of people attracted to the public sector so as to
increase rent extraction, as in Delfgaauw and Dur (2008). A full analysis of this case is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is given with the help of Figures 2A
and 2B. The types that prefer to be worker in the public sector are in the
area contained by line 2, line 5, and, in Figure 2A, line 3. An increase in the
public sector wage makes being a worker in the public sector more attractive
relative to being a worker in the private sector (line 2), to being a manager
in the public sector (line 5) and to being a manager in the private sector (line
3). Hence, lines 2 and 3 shift down and line 5 shifts to the right, thereby
increasing the set of types that prefer to become worker in the public sector.
Hence, total supply of public sector workers goes up.
For managers in the public sector, an increase in wg makes employing
workers more costly. Hence, the option of being a manager in the public
sector becomes less attractive relative to being a public sector worker (line
5), to being a manager in the private sector (line 4), and to being a private
sector worker (line 6). Thus, line 5 shifts to the right, and lines 4 and 6
shift upwards. This decreases the number of individuals who want to be
manager in the public sector. Moreover, those that remain manager in the
public sector optimally reduce the number of workers they employ. As a
result, there is less demand for public sector workers.
As demand for public sector workers decreases in wg while the supply
increases in wg, there is a single value of wg at which the public sector labour
market clears for any pair of prices pk and pg. Corollary 4.1 underlines this
result.
Corollary 4.1 For any given pg and pk, where pg < pk, there is a unique
equilibrium level of wg.
Equilibrium comparative statics are straightforward. For instance, con-
sider an exogenous increase in pg, e.g. caused by an increased demand for
public services. The direct effect is to make managing a public organisation
more attractive relative to the other three positions. Thus, some public
workers, private managers, and, in the case of Figure 2B, private workers
leave their current job to become manager in the public sector. In terms of
Figures 2A and 2B, line 5 shifts to the left, and lines 4 and 6 shift downwards.
Furthermore, the individuals who were already a public sector manager be-
fore the increase in pg expand their production. Hence, demand for public
sector workers increases, while supply goes down (as some public workers
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become public manager). To arrive at a new equilibrium, the wage in the
public sector must increase. The wage increase implies that public sector
managers reduce their production and that lines 4, 5, and 6 move back in
the opposite direction compared to the initial effect. Moreover, lines 2 and
3 move downwards, as some workers move from the private to the public
sector and, in Figure 2A, some private managers become public workers.
The extent of the wage increase relative to the increase in pg, which, by
Lemma 2, determines whether a given manager in the public sector will pro-
duce more or less output compared to the initial situation, depends on the
distribution of types f(α, γ). Similarly, the net effect on indifference lines 4,
5, and 6 and the extent to which line 2 and 3 move also depend on f(α, γ).
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that competition between people with different levels of pub-
lic service motivation and managerial ability results in a negative selection
of managerial ability into the public sector. The willingness of (marginal)
public sector workers and managers to accept lower pay in return for (what
they perceive as) a more meaningful or enjoyable job translates into lower
per-unit output price in the public sector compared to the private sector.
This, in turn, creates a public-private earnings penalty for managers which
increases in managerial ability. As a result, the relative attractiveness of
the public sector decreases in ability, which implies that relatively many of
the ‘best and brightest’ managers of the economy reside in the private sec-
tor. Furthermore, the least-able managers may end up in the public sector,
and public managers may manage less diligently than private managers with
equal ability.
Taken together, these outcomes paint a gloomy picture of public man-
agement. Yet, this is efficient: it is the least costly way of producing a given
amount of publicly provided goods and results in maximum social welfare
as well. This has important repercussions for public sector human resource
policies. When public service motivation is sufficiently prevalent in (a sub-
sector of) the public sector, agencies should not aim to recruit and retain the
‘best and brightest’ managers at all cost, but rather aim at less productive,
but better motivated people. Even though this results in relatively weak
public management, the benefits of improving the pool of public managers
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by matching remuneration to private sector levels, as called for by various
policy reports discussed in the Introduction, are bound to be smaller than
the cost.
Throughout, an individual’s intrinsic utility has been assumed constant.
When public service motivation stems from the joy of helping people, this
intrinsic utility may depend on one’s effort, especially in non-managerial
tasks as these, more so than managerial tasks, may involve helping clients
and thereby invoke warm-glow feelings. In our model, linking intrinsic utility
to non-managerial effort would strengthen the results. First, it would im-
ply that managers in the public sector have an intrinsic incentive to reduce
their managerial effort and increase their effort on non-managerial tasks.
Second, as better managers focus more on managerial effort, they derive
less intrinsic utility, so that managing a unit in the public sector becomes
even less rewarding for high-quality managers relative to less able managers
(line 4 pivots counterclockwise). Both of these effects reduce managerial
effectiveness in the public sector relative to the private sector. Furthermore,
some highly motivated people may refrain from becoming public manager
and rather choose to become or remain public worker, because they dread
exchanging non-managerial tasks for the intrinsically less rewarding man-
agerial tasks (line 5 rotates clockwise).
The inferior management of public sector organisations implies that pro-
ductivity is lower than in comparable private sector organisations. Gener-
ally, the low productivity and apparent overstaffing of government agencies
is attributed to bureaucratic empire-building (Niskanen, 1971) or to political
preferences for increased employment (Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; Corneo
and Rob, 2003). Our theory suggests an efficiency reason: coupling less
productive but highly motivated management to a larger personnel base is
cost-efficient.
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A Appendix: Proofs
For notational convenience, we suppress in this appendix as much as possible
the arguments of the derivatives of the production function and the cost
function as well as the sub- and superscripts for type i, job j, and sector s.
A.1 Second-order conditons for maximum managers’ utility
First-order conditions (12), (13), and (14) describe a global maximum when
the following second-order conditions are satisfied:¯¯¯¯
¯α2pqMM − cmm αpqME − cmeαpqME − cme pqEE − cee
¯¯¯¯
¯ > 0
and ¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯α2pqMM − cmm αpqME − cme αpqMEαpqME − cme pqEE − cee pqEE
αpqME pqEE pqEE
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ < 0.
Using cmm = cee = cem, these conditions can be rewritten as:
α2p2
¡
qMMqEE − q2ME
¢
− cee(α2pqMM + pqEE − 2αpqME) > 0, (30)
−α2p2
£
qMMqEE − q2ME
¤
cee < 0. (31)
As the second term in (30) is positive, it follows from (30) and (31) that if
qMMqEE − q2ME > 0
for all m, em, and n, then the second-order sufficient conditions for a global
maximum are fulfilled.
A.2 Proposition 1
Applying the implicit function theorem to the system of first-order condi-
tions (12), (13), and (14), we obtain:
dα (pqM +mαpqMM)+dm
¡
α2pqMM − cmm
¢
+dem (αpqME − cme)+dn (αewpqME) = 0,
dα (mpqEM ) + dm (αpqEM − cem) + dem (pqEE − cee) + dn (ewpqEE) = 0,
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dα (mpqEM ) + dm (αpqEM ) + dem (pqEE) + dn (ewpqEE) = 0.
Solving for the effects of an increase in α onm, em, and n gives, respectively:
dm
dα
= −
qM +mα
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
α2
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i > 0, (32)
dem
dα
= −dm
dα
< 0, (33)
dn
dα
= −mqEM
ewqEE
− dm
dα
µ
αqEM
ewqEE
− 1
ew
¶
> 0, (34)
d (new + em)
dα
= −mqEM
qEE
− dm
dα
µ
αqEM
qEE
¶
> 0. (35)
By second-order condition (15) and qEE < 0, the numerator in (32) is neg-
ative. Hence, condition (2) is sufficient to ensure that dmdα > 0. The signs of
(33), (34), and (35) follow accordingly.
As (32) and (35) imply that both elements in q(E,M) increase with α,
and q(E,M) is increasing in α for given E and M , it follows that output
increases in α. Substituting (5) into (3), taking the derivative with respect
to α, and using the envelop theorem shows that utility increases in α:
∂Um
∂α
= mpqM > 0.
Likewise, we obtain the comparative static effects of p and w, respec-
tively:
dm
dp
= − (qMqEE − qEqME)
αp
£
qMMqEE − q2EM
¤ > 0,
dem
dp
= −dm
dp
< 0,
dn
dp
= − 1
ewqEE
∙
qE
p
+
dm
dp
(αqEM − qEE)
¸
> 0,
d (new + em)
dp
= − 1
qEE
∙
qE
p
+
dm
dp
(αqEM )
¸
> 0,
dm
dw
= − (αqME − qEE)
α2p
¡
qMMqEE − q2EM
¢ < 0,
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dem
dw
=
1
cee
− dm
dw
> 0,
dn
dw
= − 1
ewqEE
∙
dm
dw
(αqEM − qEE) +
(pqEE − cee)
pcee
¸
< 0,
d (new + em)
dw
= − 1
qEE
∙
dm
dw
(αqEM )−
1
p
¸
< 0.
A.3 Comparative statics when optimal em = 0
Managers with sufficiently high managerial ability optimally focus on man-
agerial tasks and set em = 0. Clearly, at these levels of α, we have demdα = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the remaining first-order condi-
tions (12) and (14), we obtain:
dα (pqM +mαpqMM) + dm
¡
α2pqMM − cmm
¢
+ dn (αewpqME) = 0,
dα (mpqEM ) + dm (αpqEM ) + dn
³
e˜kwpqEE
´
= 0.
Solving for the effects of an increase in α on m and n gives, respectively:
dm
dα
= −
qM +mα
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
α2
h
qMM − q
2
EM
qEE
i
− cmmp
> 0, (36)
dn
dα
= −mqEM
e˜kwqEE
− dm
dα
αqEM
e˜kwqEE
> 0. (37)
The signs of (36) and (37) follow from (2) and (15) and are the same as
in the case where optimal em > 0. Ignoring the effects through changes in
the second derivatives of the production function, it is clear that the effects
are smaller in magnitude than those above for managers who exert strictly
positive non-managerial effort.
Similarly, we obtain the effects of p and w, respectively:
dm
dp
= − α (qMqEE − qMEqE)
α2p
£
qMMqEE − q2EM
¤
− qEEcmm
> 0,
dn
dp
= − 1
ewqEE
∙
dm
dp
(αqEM ) +
qE
p
¸
> 0,
dm
dw
= − αqME
α2p
£
qMMqEE − q2EM
¤
− qEEcmm
< 0,
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dn
dw
=
1
ewpqEE
− dm
dp
µ
αqEM
ewqEE
¶
< 0.
A.4 Proposition 2
In the proof to Proposition 2 in the main text, it is shown that line 4 as
described by (25) starts at α = γg = 0, and that the slope of line 4 as
described by (26) is positive for all αi if
wk
pk
≤ w
g
pg
. Now suppose that
wk
pk
>
wg
pg
. Using (18), we can rewrite (26) to:
dγg
dα
=
1
α
³
m˜kiw
k − m˜giwg
´
. (38)
If
wk
pk
>
wg
pg
, it follows from Lemma 2 that m˜ki < m˜
g
i , implying that (38)
can be negative. The effect of α on (38) is given by
d2γg
dα2
=
1
α
µ∙
dm˜ki
dα
− m˜
k
i
α
¸
wk −
∙
dm˜gi
dα
− m˜
g
i
α
¸
wg
¶
.
Using (32), this can be rewritten to
d2γg
dα2
=
1
α
⎛
⎜⎜⎝−
wkq˜kM
α2
∙
q˜kMM −
(q˜kEM)
2
q˜kEE
¸ + wg q˜gM
α2
∙
q˜gMM −
(q˜gEM)
2
q˜gEE
¸ − 2
α
³
m˜kiw
k − m˜giwg
´⎞⎟⎟⎠ ,
(39)
where the derivatives of q are evaluated at the optimal levels of m, em, and
n. When (38) is negative (zero), the last term in (39) is positive (zero).
By (15) and qEE < 0, the two denominators in (39) are negative, and if
wk
pk
>
wg
pg
, it follows from (18) that q˜kM > q˜
g
M , implying that w
kq˜kM > w
g q˜gM .
Hence, if we restrict the third derivatives of q(E,M) such that the difference
between the two denominators in (39) is negligible, (39) is always positive for
all α > 0 when (38) is non-positive. Hence, if line 4 has a local extremum, it
is a minimum. This implies that if some part of line 4 is downward sloping,
line 4 is either downward sloping for all α ≥ 0 or reaches a minimum at some
level of α and has a (weakly) positive slope for higher values of α (that is,
line 4 is U-shaped).
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We have shown that line 4 starts at α = γg = 0 and can have three
shapes: upward sloping, downward sloping, or U-shaped. This implies that
if there are individuals who prefer to be manager in the private sector rather
than manager in the public sector, line 4 must be either upward sloping or
U-shaped. In both cases, line 4 is upward sloping in the relevant area where
α > 0 and γg ≥ 0, as stated in Proposition 2.
A.5 Proposition 3
Public monopsonist
Consider a public monopsonist that aims to minimise the cost of producing
a given amount of public sector goods Qg. The monopsonist has full infor-
mation about individuals’ type and can verify the effort they exert. It can
attract individuals to the public sector by offering wage wi to individual i
conditional on the provision of effort levels egi and m
g
i . Provided that the
individual accepts the offer, the monopsonist assigns the individual to a unit
and a job within that unit (worker or manager). Individual i accepts the
offer when the participation constraint is fulfilled:
wi + γ
g
i − c(e
g
i +m
g
i ) ≥ max[U0, Uki,m], (40)
where Uki,m is utility attained by individual i when managing a unit in the
private sector, as given by (16). Using (9) and Lemma 3, we can rewrite
this to:
wi ≥ U0 − γgi + c(e
g
i +m
g
i ) for αi ≤ bαk,
wi ≥ Uki,m − γ
g
i + c(e
g
i +m
g
i ) for αi > bαk. (41)
It follows that cost per unit of output decreases with γg. Hence, the monop-
sonist prefers to attract better motivated over less motivated people. Fur-
thermore, as productivity is constant in γg for both public sector jobs and
constant in α for public workers and increasing in α for public managers,
there can be only one level of α at which the monopsonist is indifferent be-
tween assigning people to a managerial job or a non-managerial job. Let bαg
denote this level of α, and let γL(α) be the motivation of the least motivated
individual the monopsonist attracts among individuals with ability α.
Total cost of public production are given by
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C =
Z α¯
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
wif(α, γg)dγgdα+
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
hf(α, γg)dγgdα, (42)
where the first term gives the total wage bill and the second term gives
the total amount spent on setting up units, which cost h per manager.
Substituting (41) into (42) gives
C =
Z α¯
eαk
Z γ¯
γL(α)
h
Uki,m − γ
g
i + c(e
g
i +m
g
i )
i
f(α, γg)dγgdα
+
Z eαk
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
[U0 − γgi + c(e
g
i +m
g
i )]f(α, γ
g)dγgdα
+
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
hf(α, γg)dγgdα. (43)
The production constraint states that the sum of the amounts produced in
the units of all public managers equals Qg:
Qg =
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
q(ngi e
g
w + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m)f(α, γ
g)dγgdα, (44)
where we use the fact that workers’ productivity is independent of type.
Lastly, the monopsonist must obtain sufficient worker effort:
egw
Z eαg
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
f(α, γg)dγgdα = egw
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
ngi f(α, γ
g)dγgdα. (45)
The monopsonist minimises (43) with respect to bαg, γL(α), egw, egi,m, mgi,m,
and ngi for all α, subject to the production constraint (44) and the worker
effort constraint (45). For ease of exposition, we neglect the constraint that
γL(α) ≤ γ¯ for all α.
After some rewriting, the Lagrangian equation reads
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Γ =
Z α¯
eαk
Z γ¯
γL(α)
h
Uki,m − γ
g
i + c(e
g
i +m
g
i )
i
f(α, γg)dγgdα
+
Z eαk
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
[U0 − γgi + c(e
g
i +m
g
i )]f(α, γ
g)dγgdα
+
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
[h− λ1q(ngi egw + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) + λ2e
g
wn
g
i ]f(α, γ
g)dγgdα
+λ1Qg − λ2
(Z eαg
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
egwf(α, γ
g)dγgdα
)
,
where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers for the production constraint
(44) and the worker effort constraint (45), respectively.
The first-order conditions with respect to egi,m, m
g
i,m, and n
g
i for public
managers with ability αi are given by, respectively:
−λ1qE(ngi egw + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) + cE(e
g
i +m
g
i ) = 0,
−λ1αiqM(ngi egw + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) + cM(e
g
i +m
g
i ) = 0,
−λ1qE(ngi egw + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) + λ2 = 0. (46)
Comparison with (12) - (14) shows that with λ1 and λ2 taking the role of
pg and wg, respectively, these first-order conditions are identical to those
for optimal managerial choices under competition. The first-order condition
with respect to egw gives for every public worker, using (46)
−λ2 + cE(egw) = 0,
which is identical to the first-order condition for optimal worker effort under
competition (6) when λ2 = wg. The first-order condition with respect to bαg
gives
−
Z γ¯
γL(α)
[h− λ1q(ngi egw + e
g
i,m, bαgmgi,m) + λ2egw (ni + 1)]f(bαg, γg)dγg = 0,
such that bαg is defined by −λ1q(ngi egw + egi,m, bαgmgi,m) + λ2egw (ni + 1)+ h =
0, which is identical to the definition of bαg under competition (27) when
λ1 = pg and λ2 = wg. Lastly, the first-order condition with respect to γL(α)
36
gives
−
Z α¯
eαk
h
Uki,m − γL(α) + c(e
g
i +m
g
i )
i
f(α, γL(α))dα−
Z eαk
0
[U0−γL(α)+c(e
g
i+m
g
i )]f(α, γL(α))dα
−
Z α¯
eαg
[h−λ1q(ngi egw+e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m)+λ2e
g
wn
g
i ]f(α, γL(α))
gdα+λ2
(Z eαg
0
egwf(α, γL(α))dα
)
= 0.
Hence, for any public worker with α ≤ bαk, it must hold that U0 − γL(α) +
c(egw) − λ2egw = 0. Similarly, for public workers with α > bαk, it must hold
that Uki,m−γL(α)+ c(e
g
i +m
g
i )−λ2e
g
w = 0. Using (16), the relation between
γL(α) and α for public workers is given by
dγL(α)
dα
= 0 for αi ≤ bαk;
dγL(α)
dα
= m˜ki,mp
kqM(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m) for αi > bαk,
where all effects of α through egw, e˜kw, m˜ki,m, and n˜
k
i are zero by the envelop
theorem. Both levels and slopes of γL(α) are identical to those defining
indifference lines 2 and 3 under competition, respectively, when λ1 = pg and
λ2 = wg.
For any public manager with α ≤ bαk, it must hold that U0 − γL(α) +
c(egi + m
g
i ) + h − λ1q(n
g
i e
g
w + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) + λ2e
g
wn
g
i = 0, and for public
managers with α > bαk, it must hold that Uki,m + h− γL(α) + c(egi +mgi )−
λ1q(n
g
i e
g
w + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) + λ2e
g
wni = 0. The relation between γL(α) and α
for public managers is given by
dγL(α)
dα
= −λ1mgi,mq(n
g
i e
g
w + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) for αi ≤ bαk;
dγL(α)
dα
= m˜ki,mp
kqM(n˜ki e˜
k
w + e˜
k
i,m, αim˜
k
i,m)− λ1m
g
i,mq(n
g
i e
g
w + e
g
i,m, αim
g
i,m) for αi > bαk,
where again all effects of α through egw, e˜kw, m˜ki,m, and n˜
k
i are zero by the
envelop theorem. Both levels and slopes of γL(α) are identical to those
defining indifference lines 6 and 4 under competition, respectively, when
λ1 = pg and λ2 = wg.
Noting that the public monopsonist must meet the marginal workers’
and marginal managers’ participation constraints, it follows that the shadow
price of public output λ1 and the shadow price of worker’s effort λ2 equal pg
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and wg, respectively. Hence, our results above imply that the public monop-
sonist recruits the same individuals, assigns them to the same position, and
induces similar effort levels and unit sizes as arise under competition, given
the level of public production.
Social planner
Now consider a social planner that wants to maximise welfare, defined as the
sum of all individuals’ utility minus the cost of public production,22 subject
to the constraints (44) and (45). Again, the planner has full information
about individuals’ type and can contract on the effort they exert. It can
attract individuals to the public sector and assign them to a unit and job
by offering wage wi to individual i conditional on the provision of effort
levels egi and m
g
i and subject to the participation constraint (40). Utility of
individual i in the public sector is given by wi + γ
g
i − c(e
g
i +m
g
i ). Utility of
individual i in the private sector is given bymax[U0, Uki,m]. Clearly, the social
planner prefers to attract better motivated over less motivated people to the
public sector, and assigns the most able individuals it attract to managerial
positions. Total welfare is given by
Ψ =
Z α¯
eαk
Z γL(α)
0
Uki,mf(α, γ
g)dγdα+
Z eαk
0
Z γL(α)
0
U0f(α, γg)dγdα
+
Z α¯
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
{wi + γgi − c(egi +mgi )} f(α, γg)dγdα
−
Z α¯
0
Z γ¯
γL(α)
wif(α, γg)dγdα−
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
hf(α, γg)dγgdα, (47)
where the first line gives the utility of all individuals in the private sector,
the second line describes the utility of all individuals attracted to the public
sector, and the last two terms give the public sector wage bill and fixed unit
cost, respectively. Note that we can rewrite (47) such that wi drops out.
Clearly, since taxes are nondistortionary and utility linear in income, public
sector wages do not affect total welfare (but must fulfill the individual’s
participation constraint). After some straightforward algebra, social welfare
22Recall that, when defining an individual’s utility, we ignored taxation for notational
convenience. This was innocuous, as taxes are lump-sum. Here, however, we need to take
the level of taxes into account as it does affect individuals’ utilities and, hence, social
welfare. Hence, we substract the cost of public production (which equal the level of taxes)
from the sum of individuals’ utility.
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(47) can be rewritten as
Ψ =
Z α¯
eαk
Z γ
γL(α)
h
γgi − c(e
g
i +m
g
i )− Uki,m
i
f(α, γg)dγdα
+
Z eαk
0
Z γ
γL(α)
[γgi − c(e
g
i +m
g
i )− U0] f(α, γg)dγdα
−
Z α¯
eαg
Z γ¯
γL(α)
hf(α, γg)dγdα+
Z α¯
0
Z γ
0
Uki,mdγdα.
This objective function is identical to the objective function (43) minimised
by the monopsonist, expect for the signs (which are, naturally, opposite) and
the last term (which is a constant). Hence, social-welfare maximisation, cost-
minimisation, and perfect competition yield the same selection of people to
sectors and positions as well as identical levels of effort and unit size.
A.6 Proposition 4
From Figures 2A and 2B, it follows that the supply of workers in the public
sector is given by the area in between indifference line 2, line 5, and, in Figure
2A, line 3. The two cases depicted by Figures 2A and 2B give rise to the
following expressions for the supply of public sector workers, respectively:
S2A = N
eαkZ
0
γ¯Z
eγ
f(α, γ)dγdα+N
eαgZ
eαk
γ¯Z
γg3(α)
f(α, γ)dγdα,
S2B = N
eαgZ
0
γ¯Z
eγ
f(α, γ)dγdα.
where γg3(α) denotes the level of γ
g as described by (22) (line 3) and recall
that N is defined as the total number of people in the economy. From (11),
we know that
∂bγ
∂wg
= −e˜gw < 0. Similarly, using (10) and differentiating
(22) with respect to wg gives
∂γg3(α)
∂wg
= −e˜gw < 0. Applying the implicit
function theorem to (27), the effect of wg on bαg (line 5) is given by ∂bαg
∂wg
=
39
(n˜+ 1)e˜gw
m˜pgqM
> 0. Using Leibniz’ rule, we obtain:
∂S2A
∂wg
= −N
eαkZ
0
f(α, bγ) ∂bγ
∂wg
dα−N
eαgZ
eαk
f(α, γg3(α))
∂γg3(α)
∂wg
dα+N
γ¯Z
γg3(eαg)
f(bαg, γ)∂bαg
∂wg
dγ > 0,
∂S2B
∂wg
= N
γ¯Z
eγ
f(bαg, γ)∂bαg
∂wg
dγ −N
eαgZ
0
f(α, bγ) ∂bγ
∂wg
dα > 0.
Hence, supply increases in wg.
The demand of public sector workers is determined by managers in the
public sector. From Figures 2A and 2B, it follows that public sector man-
agers are contained in the area between line 4, line 5, and, in Figure 2B,
line 6. Let γg4(α) be the level of γ
g as determined by (25), at which people
are indifferent between managing in the private and the public sector (line
4), and let γg6(α) be the level of γ
g as determined by (29), at which people
are indifferent between working in the private sector and managing in the
public sector (line 6). The demand for public sector workers in the cases
depicted by Figures 2A and 2B is given by, respectively:
D2A = N
α¯Z
eαg
γ¯Z
γg4(α)
n˜(α)f(α, γ)dγdα,
D2B = N
eαkZ
eαg
γ¯Z
γg6(α)
n˜(α)f(α, γ)dγdα+N
α¯Z
eαk
γ¯Z
γg4(α)
n˜(α)f(α, γ)dγdα.
Differentiating γg4(α) and γ
g
6(α) with respect to w
g gives
∂γg4(α)
∂wg
=
∂γg6(α)
∂wg
=
n˜e˜w > 0. Furthermore, from Proposition 1 we know that
∂n˜(α)
∂wg
< 0. Using
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Leibniz’ rule, we obtain:
∂D2A
∂wg
= N
α¯Z
eαg
γ¯Z
γg4(α)
∂n˜(α)
∂wg
f(α, γ)dγdα−N
γ¯Z
γg4(eαg)
n˜(bαg)f(bαg, γ)∂bαg
∂wg
dγ
−N
α¯Z
eαg
n˜(α)f [α, γg4(α)]
∂γg4(α)
∂wg
dα < 0,
∂D2B
∂wg
= N
eαkZ
eαg
γ¯Z
γg6(α)
∂n˜(α)
∂wg
f(α, γ)dγdα−N
γ¯Z
γg6(eαg)
n˜(bαg)f(bαg, γ)∂bαg
∂wg
dγ
−N
eαkZ
eαg
n˜(α)f [α, γg6(α)]
∂γg6(α)
∂wg
dα+N
α¯Z
eαk
γ¯Z
γg4(α)
∂n˜(α)
∂wg
f(α, γ)dγdα
−N
α¯Z
eαk
n˜(α)f [α, γg4(α)]
∂γg4(α)
∂wg
dα < 0.
Hence, the demand for public sector workers decreases in wg, through two
channels. First, less people are willing to become manager in the public
sector. Second, those that remain reduce the number of workers they employ.
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